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This thesis looks into the challenges China is facing in its energy transition from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy. The challenges are analyzed from technical, market, and policy viewpoints in 
order to form a general view of the transition and factors affecting it. This thesis reviews existing 
literature on the subject and combines major findings from different studies and papers together. 
Lastly this thesis summarizes policy proposals for further integration of renewable energy into the 
Chinese power system.  
China is the worlds’ leading energy producer and consumer. China also leads in electricity 
produced and consumed and in renewable energy produced. Between 2010 and the first half of 
2019 China has invested more in renewable energy than any other country in the world. There 
are good reasons for China to heavily invest in renewable energy. Coal-burning poses a serious 
public health problem for Chinese citizens and China has the world’s largest greenhouse gas 
emissions, so phasing out coal-fired power in favor of renewable energy would benefit both Chi-
nese people and the global climate. Renewable energy and electrification also provide China a 
possibility to reduce its dependency of oil imports and to gain self-sufficiency in energy sector. 
Chinese energy sector has been built on its vast coal resources and coal-fired power still dom-
inates the generation mix. Due to this the power system and electricity market have been very 
inflexible. The tariffs for electricity have been heavily government regulated as has been the plan-
ning of electricity production. This system hasn’t allowed for a widespread integration of renewa-
ble energy, as renewable energy is inherently an energy source, whose output varies in time. 
Therefore, increasing flexibility of both the power system infrastructure and the electricity market 
is needed in order to integrate further renewable energy production into the Chinese power sys-
tem.  
There have been reforms aiming to reduce government regulation on the electricity market 
and to increase the flexibility of the power system. Transmission and distribution tariff reform un-
bundled transmission and distribution prices from the electricity tariffs and there have been efforts 
to promote direct trading of electricity between the producers and the consumers. One key object 
of the reforms is to establish electricity trading with the renewable energy resources rich northern 
and southwestern provinces and the coastal and central provinces, where the biggest load cen-
ters are located. New UHV transmission lines have been constructed to connect different regions, 
but trading between regions is still hindered by conflicts of interests between the local provincial 
governments. 
The scattered renewable energy legislation that lacks practicability is one culprit behind these 
conflicts. In the future, the central government needs to upgrade the legislation and implement 
concrete measures to ensure that local governments and energy enterprises work towards the 
national objective of renewable energy integration. At the same time government needs to de-
velop open regional wholesale and retail markets for electricity, also real time spot markets. To 
increase flexibility of the power system infrastructure, ancillary services and demand response 
markets are needed. Lastly, central government needs to gradually phase out feed-in tariffs for 
wind power and solar photovoltaics (PV), in order to avoid over-capacity construction and to en-
sure the long-term profitability of new energy companies. 
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Tämä kandidaatintyö analysoi haasteita, joita Kiina kohtaa siirtyessään fossiilisista polttoai-
neista uusiutuviin energialähteisiin. Kokonaiskuvan muodostamiseksi näitä haasteita tarkastel-
laan teknisestä, taloudellisesta ja poliittisesta näkökulmasta. Tämä työ kerää yhteen olemassa 
olevan kirjallisuuden havaintoja. Lopuksi työssä esitetään toimenpide-ehdotuksia uusiutuvien 
energianlähteiden integroimiseksi Kiinan sähkövoimajärjestelmään. 
Kiinan on maailman johtava energian tuottaja ja kuluttaja. Kiina johtaa myös sähkön tuotan-
nossa ja kulutuksessa sekä uusiutuvan energian tuotannossa. Vuodesta 2010 vuoden 2019 puo-
leenväliin mennessä Kiina on investoinut uusiutuvaan energiaan selvästi enemmän kuin mikään 
muu maa maailmassa. Kiinalla on myös perusteita investoida uusiutuvaan, sillä pienhiukkaspääs-
töt ovat Kiinassa vakava terveysongelma. Tämän lisäksi Kiina on maailman suurin kasvihuone-
päästöjen aiheuttaja. Uusiutuvan energian lisääminen on siis tärkeää sekä kiinalaisten kansan-
terveydelle, että ilmastolle. Lisäksi sähköistyminen ja uusiutuvan energian käyttöönotto mahdol-
listavat Kiinalle siirtymisen tuontiöljyriippuvaisuudesta kohti energiaomavaraisuutta. 
Kiinan energiasektori on rakentunut pitkälti suurten hiilivarantojen varaan ja hiilivoima hallitsee 
energiantuotantoa. Tästä syystä kiinan energiajärjestelmässä ei ole juuri joustavuutta. Se on ollut 
myös vahvasti keskusjohtoisesti säännelty. Koska uusiutuvan energian tuotanto vaihtelee sää-
oloista riippuen, uusituvan energian integroiminen sähkövoimajärjestelmään vaatii siltä jousta-
vuutta. Joustavuuden lisääminen energiajärjestelmässä onkin edellytys uusiutuvan energian käy-
tön lisäämiselle Kiinassa. 
Kiinassa on käyty läpi reformeja, joiden tarkoituksena on vähentää keskushallinnon sääntelyä, 
vapauttaa sähkömarkkinoita ja lisätä sähkövoimajärjestelmän joustavuutta. Siirto- ja jakelumak-
sut on irrotettu sähkön hinnoista ja on kannustettu suoraan sähkökauppaan tuottajien ja kulutta-
jien välillä. Koska Kiinan merkittävimmät uusiutuvan energian resurssit sijaitsevat pohjoisessa ja 
luoteessa ja kulutuskeskukset rannikoilla ja maan keskiosissa, yksi tärkeä tavoite on mahdollistaa 
sähkökauppa näiden välillä. Tätä on tuettu rakentamalla uusia korkeajännitelinjoja näiden aluei-
den välillä. Kaupankäyntiä kuitenkin häiritsevät provinssien taloudelliset eturistiriidat. 
Yksi syy näihin haasteisiin on Kiinan hajanainen ja ylätasoinen energialainsäädäntö. Tulevai-
suudessa keskushallinnon tulee selkeyttää ja yhtenäistää lainsäädäntöä sekä tarkentaa paikal-
lishallinoille ja energiayhtiöille kohdennettuja velvoitteita. Tämä on välttämätöntä, jotta kansalliset 
tavoitteet uusiutuvan energian integroinnista saadaan jalkautettua käytäntöön. Samaan aikaan 
keskushallinnon on kuitenkin myös vähennettävä sääntelyä sähkön hinnoittelussa ja tuotannon 
suunnittelussa sekä luotava tukku- ja kuluttajamarkkinat sähköenergialle. Myös reaaliaikaiset 
spot-markkinat tarvitaan tukemaan markkinoiden joustavuutta. Lisäksi tarvitaan markkinat kysyn-
täjoustolle ja liitännäispalveluille, kuten säätövoimalle ja loistehon kompensoinnille. Viimeisenä, 
keskushallinnon on vähitellen luovuttava syöttötariffeista, jotta vältetään yli-investointeja ja var-
mistetaan uusien sähköntuotantoyhtiöiden toiminnan kestävyys ja kannattavuus pitkällä täh-
täimellä. 
 
Avainsanat: Uusiutuva energia, tuulivoima, aurinkovoima, Kiina, energiapolitiikka, 
sähkövoimajärjestelmä, sähkömarkkinat, energiajärjestelmän muutos 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
China is the world’s biggest energy producer and consumer and also the world’s biggest 
electricity consumer and producer [1][2][5]. According to International Energy Agency 
(IEA) world’s total electricity production reached 25 721 TWh in 2017 and according to 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), China’s electricity production reached 
6495 TWh, which is approximately 25 % of the total world electricity production [2][3]. 
China’s electricity production still relies heavily on coal-fired power. According to National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), the output of thermal power electricity in year 2017 
was 4663 TWh. The output of nuclear power electricity in 2017 was 248 TWh and com-
bined output from hydro, wind and solar power was 1602 TWh. Hydro power output 
amounted for 1190 TWh and wind and solar 295 TWh and 118 TWh, respectively [3][4]. 
So, in 2017 roughly 72 % of the electricity produced in China came from thermal power, 
26 % from renewable sources and 4 % from nuclear power. China still relies heavily on 
fossil fuels for its electricity production, although it has made significant investments in 
renewable energy sources in the 2010’s. China is the world’s leading investor in renew-
able energy and with a great margin. As seen in Figure 1., from 2010 to first half of 2019 
China has invested 758 $BN in renewable energy, which is more than double the amount 
second biggest investor United States has invested. [6] 
There are also significant reasons for China to invest heavily in renewable energy 
sources. China’s metropolitan areas have been plagued by serious air pollution problems 
for decades. In 2016 Tsinghua University and the Health Effects Institute conducted a 
study that identified coal combustion to be the largest singular source of air-pollution 
related health effects. In 2013, it was linked to 366 000 premature deaths in China [6]. 
The research program Global Burden of Disease also approximated that in 2013 overall 
exposure to fine particulate air pollution was linked to total of 916,000 premature deaths 
in China [7]. In the light of these findings, it’s clear that substituting coal power with re-
newable energy would also have significant public health benefits. 
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In 2016 China signed the Paris Agreement, the global United Nations (UN) led agree-
ment to cut down greenhouse-gas-emissions. The Paris Agreement aims to prevent the 
global average temperature from rising over 2°C above the pre-industrial levels and at-
tempts to limit the increase to 1,5°C. In 2018 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) published a report that presented a great deal of scientific evidence for 
limiting the temperature rise to a maximum of 1,5°C. Among these findings was the risk 
of irreversible changes and loss of vital ecosystems, if global average temperature rises 
over 1,5°C from the pre-industrial levels. [8] Currently the world is on a course that would 
lead to increase of at least 3°C by the end of the century, states UN Environment Pro-
gramme Emissions Gap Report 2018 [9]. As energy sector accounts for two thirds of 
global emissions, the IPCC 2018 report states, that most pathways to low-carbon econ-
omy require rapid development of renewable energy and a doubling of energy efficiency 
[8]. This idea is also seconded by a 2018 analysis published by International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA). According to the analysis, the most cost-efficient method to 
reach the 90% reduction of energy related emissions required in order to meet the Paris 
Agreement target, is the implementation of renewable energy and improving energy ef-
ficiency. [10] 
Figure 1. Global investment in renewable energy capacity in $BN, from year 2010 to 
year 2019 1H [6]. 
3 
 
China also stands to gain a lot from the energy transformation in the form of energy 
security and global influence. Currently China is heavily dependent on oil imports, that 
have been growing steadily. In the long-term electrification and significant investment in 
renewable energy would allow China to become self-sufficient in energy production. [6] 
As the leading investor in renewable energy and the leading producer, exporter and in-
staller of renewable energy technology, China is in a very good position to become the 
world’s renewable energy superpower. [12] 
In the 2016 Paris agreement China has agreed to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030 or 
earlier and to increase the share of non-fossil energy sources in the total primary energy 
supply to around 20% by 2030 [13]. It is estimated that China will also hit these targets 
if it succeeds in the implementation of its current policies and plans [14]. Still, the targets 
should be upgraded to be much more ambitious in order for them to be consistent with 
the 2°C limit, let alone with the 1,5°C limit [15].  
China has strong reasons to invest greatly in renewable energy sources, but when com-
paring the capacity installed and energy produced, it becomes apparent that heavy in-
vestment in new capacity hasn’t increased the share of renewable energy sources in the 
electricity production mix in accordance to the new capacity built. There has been both 
significant curtailment of wind and solar power electricity [16] and the capacity factors for 
wind and solar power plants are low [17].  Whether trying to improve air quality or combat 
climate change, China needs to be able to substitute fossil-based power sources with 
clean sources.  Regardless of China’s heavy investment in renewable energy, it still also 
builds more coal fired power [18] and has problems in increasing the share of clean 
energy sources in its energy mix to a level that would be consistent with the 1,5°C limit 
for global warming. This thesis looks into the challenges China is facing in its energy 
transition from technical, market and policy viewpoints and seeks to form a general view 
of these challenges. To conclude this thesis also summarizes some policy proposals 
presented in the existing literature. 
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2. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES CHINA FACES IN 
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM TRANSITION 
China is the world’s third or fourth largest country depending on how the area is meas-
ured [27][28], so the distances between different regions are long. The geography of 
China is also very varied, including deserts and mountain ranges. Due to its long coast-
line, China has plentiful wind power resources. Onshore potential is estimated to range 
from 800G W to 3.4 TW and offshore potential from 297 GW to 1007 GW. China has a 
stationary solar power capacity that is estimated at 4,7 TW to 39,3 TW and distributed 
solar capacity at about 200G W. The solar power resources are most abundant in the 
sparsely populated north and northwest provinces of Inner Mongolia, Xianjiang and 
Gansu. The richest wind resources are also located in the northern and coastal regions 
and hydro resources in the southwest regions. In contrast, most of the population lives 
in the central and southeastern coastal provinces. This poses a technological challenge 
for the electric power system as the power grids in the northern regions are relatively 
poorly developed and the demand centers are located far away in the southern coast. 
[5] This together with the fact that the output of solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind power 
resources varies in time challenges the current power system infrastructure in China that 
is built for a coal-fired power dominated generation mix [16][29]. 
2.1 Inflexible power system 
Renewable energy integration requires flexibility from the electric power system, as me-
teorological and geographical factors affect the output of renewable energy power. 
Therefore, complex planning and operation scheduling are required in the implementa-
tion of renewable energy, in order to respond rapidly to changes in supply and demand. 
This chapter analyses different approaches to increasing the power system flexibility and 
the challenges encountered in their implementation. This chapter also points out factors 
affecting the curtailment of renewable energy and the inefficiency of wind power in China. 
2.1.1 Transmission systems 
 
Well-planned investment in high-voltage transmission systems is one of the most critical 
steps in preparing for higher levels of renewable energy penetration [19]. This combined 
with greater grid interconnection could reduce grid congestion and allow the demand 
centers to use the renewable resources and reduce renewable energy curtailment during 
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regional valley load periods. As the electricity resources and demand in China are lo-
cated unevenly, Chinese power system is based on transmission of western electricity 
to eastern regions and supply of northern and southern electricity, which is shown in 
Figure 2. Nationwide electricity interconnection is very important for the Chinese power 
system and in 2017 the construction of six main regional grid frameworks was completed. 
[29] Still, the development of power grids has mainly concentrated on large-capacity and 
long-distance Ultra High Voltage (UHV) transmission projects, which has resulted in low 
utilization of the existing inter-provincial and inter-regional 500 kV and 750 kV transmis-
sion lines. This has resulted in low transmission line resource allocation efficiency. In 
2016 the ratio of combined electricity consumption to transmission line circuit length in 
China was 9,55 million kWh per km, which is barely 80% of European Union and U.S. 
utilization and far from the 22,91 million kWh per km utilization of Japan. There have also 
been problems with the new UHV power transmission projects, as they were rushed 
before technology was fully mature and this has led to reliability problems and lower 
transmission capacities. Yet one factor contributing to low utilization rates for power grids 
is the use of a planned scheduling system which lacks flexible electric power exchange 
across provinces and regions. Unlike in countries with high renewable energy penetra-
tion such as Denmark or Germany, the operational model of China is unable to perform 
real-time adjustments based on the changing characteristics of the receiving and send-
ing sides of the transmission channels. [29]  
 
Figure 2. The regional power grid division and the national power flow pattern in 
China [30]. 
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2.1.2 Ancillary services 
 
As the output of renewable energy power varies in time, measures to increase the power 
system flexibility are required when a high amount of renewable energy production is 
connected to the power system. These measures are referred as ancillary services, that 
can be provided by network users such as generators or customers or by various system 
assets. In China ancillary services are categorized into basic ancillary services, such as 
frequency regulation, reactive power and basic peak regulation and paid ancillary ser-
vices, such as automatic generation control (AGC), standing and spinning reserve, paid 
reactive and peak power regulation and black start capability. These services allow sys-
tem operators to maintain the power quality as well as the stability and integrity of the 
transmission or distribution system. Electricity generation units are required to provide 
the basic ancillary services, depending on the features of the generation units, and they 
are not compensated. [16] In history only coal-power plants used to provide ancillary 
services in China and the costs of these services were pooled among thermal genera-
tors, which gave little incentive for flexible operation or integration of renewable energy 
sources [29]. Also, although now the services categorized as paid ancillary services are 
compensated, the payments are so low, that they barely cover the costs of the ancillary 
services. [16] China lack’s standardized mechanisms to increase the supply of the paid 
ancillary services and this poses a difficulty for renewable energy integration. A solution 
for this problem could be establishing ancillary service markets that have been piloted in 
the northern and southern regions since 2017. These markets cater to regional chal-
lenges in different provinces. In the northern Gansu and Qinhai provinces capacity re-
serve markets have been set up as they suffer from curtailment of wind and solar power. 
At the same time in southern Guangdong province the market began with frequency 
regulation services as the province had an enduring shortfall in that capacity. The results 
from these provincial pilots are promising, but more work is needed to ensure the ancil-
lary service markets have transparent and persistent rules that allow cost-effective in-
vestments and wide participation. [29] 
2.1.3 Demand response 
 
Yet another way to increase power system flexibility is to control the power demand. This 
is called demand side response (DR) and it means that the electricity users adjust their 
usage intelligently to balance the energy production and demand. This could for example 
mean that factories delay some energy intensive processes in order to make room for 
the demand by households in the cities, that consume more energy in the evenings. 
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According to China Renewable Energy Outlook 2018 (CREO 2018), the local govern-
ments in China are encouraged to enforce economic, administrative and technical 
measures to orderly manage power consumption. The order of the measures taken is: 
first, shifting peak load of power consumption to other periods; second, peak avoidance 
through interruptible loads; third, power restriction; and finally, power rationing [29]. In 
2011 and 2012 The National Development and Reform Commission of China (NDRC) 
has launched a demand side management pilot where cities attempted to cut the peak 
demand for electricity in commercial buildings and industrial facilities and improve the 
efficiency of power consumption. According to CREO 2018 [29], the load aggregators 
(individual energy users banded together in order to participate in the grid dispatching of 
DR) gained more prominent roles and functions during the implementation of these DR 
programs. Still, the programs also highlighted several problems for DR in China. Demand 
side response requires accurate measurement and data transmission systems and 
therefore large investments to installation and maintenance of online metering equip-
ment and data transmission equipment is needed. As many DR events are not automatic, 
the response speed in China is slow, the peak shaving capacity poor and the magnitude 
uncertain. China needs to provide transparent information about local generation and 
load and expand the extent of involvement from large customers to small and medium -
sized customers also. There are also market measures to be taken. The most important 
is the implementation of a complete and competitive power market with wholesale and 
retail markets and dynamic price signals. A transparent and open market is needed in 
order to allow companies and DR aggregators to assess their individual potential of de-
livering flexible loads. Other needed market measures are to increase the compensation 
of DR to reflect its full system value and to enhance stakeholder involvement and to 
spread knowledge about the DR functionalities. [29] The implementation of a full-fledged 
power market is discussed in greater detail in the chapter 3, as it is a very crucial step 
for China to take on its path to a higher penetration of renewable energy.  
2.2 The curtailment of solar PV and wind power 
Bulk of China’s solar PV and wind power resources are located in the “Three North’s” 
Region of China, consisting of North China, Northeast China and Northwest China. 
These regions are far away from the load centers, so problems have emerged when the 
output of renewable energy sources combined with electricity produced by thermal power 
has surpassed the local electricity demand in these regions. Large scale curtailment of 
wind power began in 2009 and spread to other regions in the year 2010. [17] This means 
that some of the energy produced has been abandoned as it hasn’t been possible to 
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integrate all the energy produced to the grid. As evident in the Figure 3 the nationwide 
wind curtailment rate peaked at 17% in 2016 and nationwide solar PV curtailment rate 
peaked at 11% in 2015. This means 50 TWh and 5 TWh of energy lost respectively 
during those years.  
 
Figure 3. Wind and solar PV curtailment situations in China from 2013 to 2017 [29]. 
Zhang et al. identified the main factors for renewable energy curtailment to be the geo-
graphical distance between renewable energy resources and the load centers, the in-
flexible and coal-fired power dominated generation mix, the misalignment of transmis-
sion capacity and the renewable energy resources, the lack of energy storage as well as 
slowing growth of power demand [16]. Li et al. also point out that there is a large amount 
of combined heat and power (CHP) production in the Northeast China and therefore in 
the winter when heating is needed, the CHP units are used extensively, and renewable 
energy units are squeezed out. Also the lack of sufficient peak-valley regulation capacity 
and barriers to electricity trading between regions contributed to the curtailment. [20] 
Since 2017 the government has also taken measures to ease the curtailment of renew-
able energy. Restrictions for adding wind and solar projects in provinces with high cur-
tailment rates have been set up and as discussed earlier, investments to UHV transmis-
sion lines have been made. Clean heating is also promoted and there has been an in-
crease in trading of electricity between provinces and regions [29]. Still, some curtailment 
remains and despite the importance of the physical and technological factors, Zhang et 
al. argue, that the root causes for China’s renewable energy curtailment are in China’s 
unique electricity sector regime governed by planned economy institutions. This has led 
to inflexibility in operation, generation, demand and pricing essential in the integration of 
renewable energy [16]. Kahrl and Wang also point out China’s approach to dispatch as 
an important reason for severe renewable energy curtailment [21]. These factors will be 
discussed in the chapter 3, along with other institutional and market-related challenges 
China is facing in energy system transition.  
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2.3 Low capacity factors of wind power 
Despite China being the globally leading investor in renewable energy and having the 
largest installed capacity of renewable energy power in the world, the actual energy out-
put from renewable energy sources doesn’t seem to be as high as it should be according 
to the amount of installed capacity. When looking at wind power generation statistics 
from the years 2014-2016 in Figure 4, it is shown, that the European Union (EU) actually 
generated more energy than China with less installed capacity. According to Huenteler 
et al., in 2016 the EU generated 36% more electricity per unit of installed wind capacity 
than China and the United States (US) generated 93% more [17]. The efficiency of power 
generation can be measured with the capacity factor that is the ratio of realized energy 
generation to potential generation if a facility operated constantly at its full nameplate 
capacity. The capacity factor of Chinese wind power generation in 2016 was approxi-
mately 16,5% as the capacity factors for EU ad US were 22,5% and 32,0% respectively. 
Not only is the capacity factor lower than those of the other leading wind power genera-
tors, it is also lower than what have been used when estimating the potential for future 
Chinese wind generation as the range of assumed capacity factors range from 22,8% to 
31.8%. [17] 
 
Figure 4. Key wind sector statistics in the European Union, United States and China 
in 2014–2016: (a) generating capacity, (b) power generation, (c) average capacity 
factors (without the installation-date correction) and (d) wind's share of total power 
generation [17]. 
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Huenteler et al. developed a framework for analyzing data from nearly all wind farms in 
China and the US in order to quantify the effect of following six drivers in the performance 
of each country’s wind sector: grid-connection delays, installation-date correction, site 
selection, turbine choice, operational efficiency and curtailment. The installation date cor-
rection takes into account that newly commissioned capacity is not available to generate 
for the entire year and operational efficiency captures unobserved factors, such as losses 
from the electrical efficiency of the wind farm. The Figure 5 shows the breakdown of the 
capacity factors for wind power generation in China from 2006 to 2013. [17] 
 
Figure 5. The shortfall in average capacity factors in the cumulative installed wind 
power base in China from 2006 to 2013 attributed to seven factors: siting shortfall, 
tower height shortfall, turbine model shortfall, operational efficiency shortfall, curtail-
ment, grid-connection delay, installation-date correction. [17]. 
When taking into account the installation date correction, the capacity factor of Chinese 
wind power generation for the period of 2006-2013 is 18,2%. It is shown that the cor-
rected capacity factors actually decreased from 20,9% to 19,5% during 2006-2013. 
Huenteler et al. suspect, that the average wind farm performance in China did not meas-
urably improve between 2006 and 2013, despite significant government and industry 
efforts. Huenteler et al. found out that instead of wind farm operation, factors related to 
project design were the biggest contributors to the shortfall of the generation of the Chi-
nese wind farms. In 2013 project design gaps accounted for 17,8 percentage points of 
the total capacity factor shortfall that was 29,7 percentage points from the technical po-
tential of 49,2%. 9,1 percentage points of this is attributed to turbine model choice, 6,9 
percentage points to non-optimal selection of sites and 1,7 percentage points to tower 
height design. Grid related factors curtailment and grid connection delays accounted for 
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4,2 and 2,8 percentage points. Other operational inefficiencies accounted for a 4,8 per-
centage point shortfall. [17] As seen in Figure 5, the relative changes to each of these 
factors remain quite small over time. Huenteler et al. point out that in 2013 the US pro-
duced 60,7% of their technical potential and China produced 39,6%. In both countries 
the largest cumulative contributor is the selection of turbine model. Also siting had a 
prominent effect in both countries, though the effect was greater in China. The biggest 
difference between the countries came from the grid connection delays and curtailment, 
that clearly had more impact in China.  [17] 
According to Huenteler et al. there are two contributors to the underperformance of Chi-
nese wind power sector. First, policy efforts by the Chinese government to grow the wind 
sector have focused primarily on creating incentives to install new wind turbines rather 
than to incentivize the actual generation. This may have led to project design decisions 
that have partially neglected turbine model selection, site selection and hub height. Sec-
ond, the curtailment and grid connection delays impede the performance and it is im-
portant to take efforts to improve the grid integration and grid management, which is 
where the Chinese government’s focus has recently been. Together these findings sug-
gest that on top of reducing curtailment and improving grid connection, there is also a 
need to address the incentives and constrains affecting farm siting and technology 
choices. This is especially important in order to prevent locking further inefficiencies in 
the sector for years in the form of wind power units that cannot achieve their technical 
potential. [17] As siting choices for the wind farms are driven by trade-offs between land 
availability and prices, wind resource quality, proximity to electric grid and service roads 
and the level of available feed-in-tariffs, there are many economic factors affecting them. 
Therefore, the incentives for wind power construction should take these factors in to ac-
count instead of encouraging to prioritize capacity development over actual generation. 
Also increasing access to multi-year wind measurements and requiring these assess-
ments could reduce the amount of wind power units built in places where the wind re-
sources are actually insufficient. The incentives and economic factors affecting wind 
power are looked into in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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3. CHINESE ELECTRICITY MARKET AND ITS EF-
FECTS ON RENEWABLE ENERGY INTEGRA-
TION 
This chapter forms an overall picture of China’s electricity market and the ongoing re-
forms and analyzes their effects on renewable energy integration. In order to tackle the 
technical challenges China faces in its energy transformation many market-based and 
institutional measures need to be taken, as has become evident in the previous chapter. 
Trading electricity differs from trading other commodities in several ways: it’s not com-
mercially viable to store it extensively, so it must be consumed immediately it is gener-
ated. In other words, its supply must exactly meet the demand across the grid at any 
given time. On top of the energy-related commodities, as generation output, also power 
related commodities like ancillary services are traded in wholesale electricity markets. 
Energy can be traded in forward markets or in spot markets. [16] 
Before 2002 the Chinese electricity utility was a vertically integrated state monopoly sys-
tem as is common in transitional economies. In order to introduce competition into the 
power sector it was broken into five generating companies and two grid companies. The 
goal was to establish a competitive electricity wholesale market and to regulate grid tar-
iffs, but these reforms were later halted before the market could be established. In 2015 
new reforms were launched: the business models of grid companies were restructured 
and business was opened to non-grid companies. The idea was to separate retail seg-
ment from the natural monopoly networks and allow electricity tariffs to be determined 
by the market. [20] As evident in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China’s Document #9 “Opinions on Further Deepening the Power System Reform” that 
was issued in 2015, China’s long-term objective is to form mechanisms for market-based 
pricing of energy and to build a market system of effective competition. [22] 
In 2017 only 27% of total electricity consumed in China was traded through market, so 
though China’s power system is transitioning to a market system, it is still heavily regu-
lated. [20]. According to CREO 2018 the government still generally sets the power gen-
eration schedules, consumption plans and electricity retail tariffs. China also lacks whole-
sale electricity trading and retail competition is still a work in progress. As Market trading 
between power generators and users is limited and market-based pricing remains unes-
tablished, new capacity is being built by traditional power generators to meet the growing 
load. This hinders the utilization of renewable energy and it’s recognized that without an 
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effective modern electricity market system it is hard to drive the transformation to a higher 
integration of renewable energy and to a more optimized power structure. [29] 
3.1 Notable features of the Chinese power system 
One notable feature of the current power system in China is the equal shares dispatch 
system. It means that economic planning agencies inside provincial governments, that 
follow a “fair dispatch” principle, guide the dispatch of generators. The provincial govern-
ments make annual forecasts for total electricity demand next year and allocate the de-
mand to generators within the province. The demand can also be allocated to imports 
from outside the province. The demand is allocated so that all generators in the same 
class of generation technology get equal annual utilization hours. The idea behind this 
principle is to guarantee that all investors have a fair chance for recovering their costs. 
The feed-in tariffs for these quotas vary by generation technology and are set by the 
provincial governments. Most thermal power plants are compensated on a per-kWh ba-
sis and therefore they are determined to reach their annual allocation of hours. They also 
resist reductions in their operating hours that result from renewable energy generation. 
Under the equal shares dispatch pricing model, investments in flexible resources such 
as gas-fired power plants are discouraged, which hurts peak regulating capacity that 
would be needed to support the integration of renewable energy generation. The Re-
newable Energy law that has been in effect since 2006 requires renewable energy to be 
fully purchased by the grid and to be given priority dispatch, but despite the legislation, 
renewable energy sources have not received full priority. [20] 
Another important characteristic of the Chinese power system is the highly regulated 
electricity tariff. The benchmark wholesale tariffs for generating plants are set by the 
government. Each province creates its own Catalogue of end-user tariffs, where the tariff 
varies between different categories of end-users. These Catalogues are approved by the 
NDRC. The tariffs for wind and solar power consist of two parts, one is the benchmark 
wholesale tariff for coal-fired power units, which is paid by the grid company, and one is 
the renewable energy subsidy granted by the central government. [20] 
3.2 Dispatch practices and the curtailment of renewable energy 
power 
According to Zhang et al., economies which have electricity markets usually optimize 
dispatch based on a ‘merit order approach’, where available electrical generation is 
ranked on the basis of ascending order of price together with amount of energy that will 
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be generated. This means that electricity with lowest net costs is dispatched, which min-
imizes overall electricity system costs to consumers. In turn, in China the equal shares 
dispatch system explained earlier is used and the dispatch is guided by economic plan-
ning agencies within provincial governments. [16] Kahrl and Wang argue that the current 
electricity pricing mechanisms in China create conflicts between coal units and renewa-
ble energy units. This stems from the system where coal units receive energy-only 
benchmark price and renewable energy units receive the benchmark price combined 
with a feed-in tariff. Coal units need to operate a planned number of full load hours to 
recover their fixed costs while wind generators want to generate whenever possible in 
order to earn the feed-in tariff. This has led to financial conflicts between coal and re-
newable energy units and there have been no competitive or environmental criteria to 
identify which units to dispatch and which units to curtail. [21] The Renewable Energy 
Law of China requires a priority dispatch for renewable energy, but the current dispatch 
practices neglect this and the marginal costs and environmental advantages of renewa-
ble energy. According to CREO 2018, moving from a fixed tariff structure to a power 
market where prices are set by supply and demand could already bring a lot of resource 
flexibility potential that wasn’t incentivized before. Also, the dispatch shouldn’t in general 
be affected by administrative rules or bilateral power purchasing contracts. Instead it 
should be neutral to the underlying technology and contracts and efficiently choose the 
lowest-cost resources. [29] 
3.3 Electricity market reforms and inter-regional electricity 
trading 
One key challenge for China is to reform its highly regulated electricity tariff system. The 
deregulation of pricing could allow for a more efficient usage of different resources in the 
power system and could promote cross-regional energy trading. According to Zhang et 
al. the deregulation of electricity pricing can be divided into three components that are 
the transmission and distribution (T&D) tariff reform, the retreat of planning and the direct 
trading of electricity [16]. CREO 2018 states the T&D price reforms have already been 
implemented across China in 2017. The goal of these reforms was to change the grid 
companies’ business model so that their revenue would come from providing T&D ser-
vices and not from selling electricity. In this new system government regulators estimate 
the T&D costs and these combined with a reasonable margin for profit serve as the basis 
for the T&D prices. [29] Direct trading of electricity means that the electricity users and 
generators negotiate prices directly together without a grid company in the middle, which 
allows market-based pricing. The direct trading of electricity was originally introduced in 
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2002, but it was ceased in 2009 when some provincial governments had begun to use it 
to give power tariffs to energy intensive industries. Zhang et al. point out that there is a 
risk of local governments interfering in the direct trading of electricity and determining 
which end users’ generators should sell to or force renewable energy generators to lower 
their prices. [16] Nevertheless, direct trading of electricity between producers and con-
sumers is an important step towards competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets. 
According to CREO 2018, China has also begun to replace the previous system of 
planned power plant operating hours with a system that emphases energy security, en-
ergy integration, energy supply-demand balance and emission reduction. The plan is to 
cut down guaranteed generation hours gradually by every year by allowing coal-fired 
power plants to get only 80% of the previous year’s guaranteed hours. Also, newly built 
coal-fired power plants don’t get any guaranteed generation hours and will be dispatched 
only according to direct purchase contracts. This enforces bilateral trading between gen-
erators and retailers and is also a step towards wholesale markets. [29] 
One of the objectives stated in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s 
Document #9 issued in 2015 is to further develop inter-provincial and inter-regional 
power trading mechanisms [22]. As the renewable energy resources are unevenly di-
vided between geographical regions in China, there is a need for both inter-regional 
transmission capacity and inter-regional and inter-provincial power markets. Efforts to 
increase transmission capacity have been made and although some technological chal-
lenges, as the lack of flexible transmission line scheduling system remain, the real bar-
riers to inter-provincial trade lie elsewhere. CREO 2018 points out, that China’s power 
grid development requires establishing of an unified regional power market, marketiza-
tion of cross-provincial and regional electricity trading and promotion of resource optimi-
zation in broader areas. It also points out that the barriers to inter-provincial trading ap-
pear to be worsening and names the interest conflicts between provinces as the culprit. 
The provinces selling electricity tend to use the low-cost electricity by themselves and 
sell high-priced electricity. On the other hand, the provinces on the receiving end tend to 
perceive that competition brought by electricity imports could worsen the financial posi-
tion of their local power generation enterprises. [29] Zhang et al. also argue that one 
reason for provincial governments to prefer intra-provincial electricity trading over inter-
provincial electricity trading is the fact that the intra-provincial trading generates more 
taxes for provincial governments. Another reason addressed is that the potential for na-
tional electricity supply has surpassed the national demand and therefore importing elec-
tricity from another province could cut the revenue of local coal-fired power plants. The 
third reason mentioned is the cost of cross-provincial energy transmissions. Due to high 
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transmission prices and high losses for the inter-provincial electricity flows, the imported 
electricity may cost as much or more than the local on-grid tariffs for thermal power. [16] 
There is also a conflict of interests between the central government, that promotes re-
newable energy purchase guarantees and inter-provincial electricity trading and the pro-
vincial governments, who protect local enterprises. This has some roots in legislation 
and its enforcement, and this will be looked into in a greater detail in the chapter 4. 
CREO 2018 also reviews the Chinese government’s plans to establish a national spot 
power market as the power market reforms progress. The outlook points out that this is 
essential as without a spot power market coal power remains cheaper than the govern-
ment-set tariffs for renewable energy. In the current situation, provincial governments 
and grid companies are enticed to uphold within-province generation, which combined 
with transmission system operation practices hinders inter-provincial purchasing of re-
newable energy. In order for a spot market system to work, an ancillary service market, 
flexible and reliable power system infrastructure and T&D reform are needed. These 
conditions are met in some pilot provinces but creating inter-regional spot markets will 
still need time and resources. [29] 
3.4 Ancillary services markets and demand response 
Ancillary services and demand response capacity play a crucial role in power system 
flexibility as they help in balancing of supply and demand and maintaining power quality. 
However, the power system of China has traditionally been built for steadily producing 
thermal power plants and the need for ancillary services has been low, as have been the 
incentives to build ancillary services or demand response capacity. With the increasing 
integration of renewable energy however, the requirements for power system flexibility 
are higher and this calls for new ways to incentivize ancillary services and demand re-
sponse. The ancillary services are categorized into basic ancillary services and paid an-
cillary services. Producing basic ancillary services has been mandatory for the power 
generation units and paid ancillary services have been compensated with tariffs that just 
cover the expenses of creating ancillary service capacity. One way to incentivize ancillary 
service production would be the establishment of an ancillary services market and Li et 
al. argue, that it would be simpler than building a mature power market, as it allows 
market participants to face lower risks and less physical constraints from the power sys-
tem and it involves smaller cash flows. They argue that well-designed traded items in the 
ancillary service market could effectively increase the optimization of the power system 
and the integration of renewable energy. As an example, they use the deep peak regu-
lation trading in Northeast China, where ancillary service market successfully motivated 
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CHP units to reduce their minimum output. They point out though, that ancillary service 
markets cannot be well implemented, if dispatch agencies don’t have incentives to sup-
port this, as more trading items of ancillary services increase their workload and reduce 
opportunities for rent-seeking activities. [20] Also CREO 2018 argues, that instead of 
developing ancillary service compensation mechanisms China should develop ancillary 
services markets. Ancillary service markets are said to be fundamental in distributing 
various grid services from a centralized system based on thermal power to new market 
participants. As of 2017, government established ancillary service market pilots have 
been running in the Three Norths region and southern China. According to CREO 2018 
the results have been positive, but more work is needed to ensure the ancillary service 
markets have transparent and persistent rules that allow cost-effective investments and 
wide participation. [29] 
As discussed in the chapter 3, also building demand response capacity could improve 
the power system flexibility. CREO 2018 asserts that the successful implementation of 
DR depends on the full implementation of ongoing power market reforms in China and 
setting up wholesale and retail markets for electricity, also in the form of spot markets. 
It’s argued, that unbundling grid operation and retail sales could help to avoid conflicts 
of interests that currently stand in the way of transmitting wholesale price signals to retail 
users. The open sharing of information is especially important as DR is a complex system 
and the stakeholders, like grid companies, industrial customers and aggregators need to 
understand the DR framework and how they can take part in it and profit from it. [29]  
3.5 The effect of subsidies and green certificates on renewable 
energy integration. 
Energy subsidies are a way to incentivize desired forms of energy production and to 
keep the prices of certain energy sources competitive with the market levels.  This can 
be achieved in direct or indirect ways, such as guaranteed tariffs or taxation of other 
energy sources. Green certificates on the other hand are tradable commodities that 
prove that certain amount of electricity has been produced into the grid with renewable 
energy sources. The idea is that by purchasing a green certificate an energy consumer 
can claim that a certain amount of energy consumed by the certificate owner was from 
renewable sources. Both renewable energy subsidies and green certificates are used in 
China, but their effects on the power system are quite different. 
A 2017 study by Nicolini and Tavoni on subsidy policies of the five largest European 
countries found out that subsidies positively affected installed capacity and that feed-in 
tariffs are more effective than tradable green certificates [23]. However, as pointed out 
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in chapter 2, a high amount of installed capacity does not necessarily lead to an equally 
high output of energy into the grid. Also, China has problems in paying subsidies to re-
newable energy producers, as the funds for subsidies are collected as taxes from power 
plants, but many of those refuse to pay the tax. This has led to a great deficit on subsidy 
funds. As there are no specific penalties for not paying the tax in the Renewable Energy 
Law, Liu estimated in 2018, that the subsidy gap for renewable energy could possibly 
break through 200 billion Yuan in 2020 [25]. 
Zhu and Liao studied the effects of China’s government subsidies from 2010 to 2016 on 
the profitability of new energy companies. The conclusions were that the subsidies actu-
ally had a negative impact on the profitability of the companies. Rent-seeking activities 
were identified as one major cause of this effect. These activities show as investments 
in nonproductive activities and exploitation of the subsidies in a way that has adverse 
effects on the profitability of companies. Overcapacity was identified as another factor 
that damages the performance of new companies as local governments can easily in-
duce over-investment in order to stimulate local growth. Lastly, information asymmetries 
between the government and the companies were pointed out, as without punishment 
mechanisms large number of subsidy frauds may be committed. In order to constrain 
these practices, Zhu and Liao call for screening mechanisms to increase the companies’ 
cost of sending false signals. They also call for different subsidy mechanisms to prevent 
over-investing and to ensure that subsidies are targeted and accurate. Lastly, they sug-
gest that supply-side side subsidy policies should be combined with demand side sub-
sidy policies in order to expand new energy markets and to improve the competitiveness 
of new energy products and companies [24]. 
Some of these propositions are already being put into practice: according to CREO 2018, 
China aims to shift from fixed feed-in tariffs to more flexible, market oriented, ap-
proaches. One method is to set renewable energy obligations for each province, based 
on current renewable energy development, potential, and local electricity demand. Also 
auctions for onshore wind and solar PV are proposed. For technologies that haven’t yet 
reached similar scale, relatively fixed tariffs are proposed in order promote the develop-
ment of such resources as biomass and ocean energy. In order to phase out subsidies 
entirely, a host of market measures are named. Many of them are part of the ongoing 
market reform, such as cross-provincial trading and spot market participation. Also re-
forming tax structures, like carbon and land taxes, to reflect the external costs of energy 
sources is proposed. [29]  
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National Energy Administration of China (NEA) is also shifting the focus from capacity-
based targets to improving planning and integration of renewable energy. As there has 
been heavy wind and solar PV curtailment in the Northwestern provinces, NEA has is-
sued investment alerts for both wind and solar in these areas, in order to prevent further 
construction of over-capacity. In the areas that are marked red on the left side of the 
Figure 6, unapproved wind power projects should be suspended, and construction of 
approved projects deferred. In the orange areas no wind construction quotas were given 
in 2018, except for special projects. On the right side that is the solar PV side, in the red 
areas only units connected to UHV lines receive subsidy quotas and in the yellow areas, 
subsidy quotas are reduced by 50%. With these measures China aims to shift the focus 
of renewable energy construction to distributed generation in low-curtailment provinces. 
[29] 
 
Figure 6. (left) Investment alarms for wind power in 2018. In the red areas unap-
proved wind power projects should be suspended, and construction of approved pro-
jects deferred. In the orange areas no wind construction quotas were given in 2018, 
except for special projects; (right) Market environment assessment results for solar 
power in 2017. In the red areas, only units connected to UHV lines receive subsidy 
quotas and in the yellow areas, subsidy quotas are reduced by 50 %. [29] 
In China, the green certificate is an electronic certificate that the government can issue 
to grid connected non-hydropower renewable energy producers. Each certificate equals 
1 MWh of electricity produced and the price of the certificate is negotiated between the 
buyer and the producer. The price should not be lower than the subsidy level for the 
same amount of power output. [16] In 2018, the Renewable Energy Engineering Institute 
launched a market for voluntary green certificates. The object behind this was to reduce 
subsidy payments, raise public awareness of sustainable development and to develop 
experience for running a certificate market [29]. According to Zhang et al. the green cer-
tificate system could also allow wind and solar PV producers to receive revenue in more 
timely fashion, as government subsidy payments have been experiencing substantial 
delays [14]. The policy did not achieve its goals, as only 0,13% of wind certificates and 
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only 0,008% of solar PV certificates were sold in a timespan of nearly a year [29]. Zhang 
et al. argue that the effective implementation of the green certificate system could be 
difficult, as it’s inherently a market-based system and the electricity market is not yet 
properly developed [16]. 
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4. RENEWABLE ENERGY LEGISLATION 
In the 2010’s China has become the global leader in both investments in renewable en-
ergy and in renewable energy produced. China’s renewable energy laws and policies 
have been in an essential role in this transition and they have helped to speed up the 
deployment of renewable energy. Nonetheless, As Liu points out, there are still limita-
tions in the current framework of renewable energy law and policy in China, that hinder 
the further development of renewable energy. The current framework has been a driving 
force in starting renewable energy projects. Still, the laws and policies in China aren’t yet 
adequate to integrate renewable energy into the existing national energy system. [25] 
4.1 Scattered legislation and conflicts of interest between the 
central government and the provincial governments 
The backbone of Chinese renewable energy legislation is the Renewable Energy Law 
(REL) issued in 2005 and revised in 2009. It’s the only law in China that specifically 
regulates renewable energy. It for example states that all renewable power generated 
must be purchased by the power grids. This is clearly not the case in practice, which 
serves as an example of the major weakness of the REL: it stipulates many important 
principles, but it lacks practical measures to implement these principles and to sanction 
entities that don’t abide by these principles. Due to the rather vague legislation concern-
ing the development and utilization of renewable energy, many specific operations rely 
on policy documents. This causes confusion between law and policy and makes the 
system complex. Also adding to the complexity, many renewable energy related issues 
are also regulated by laws and policies under completely different administrative 
branches. These can be central level, local level, general, and specialized laws. This 
means that the regulations of a given issue can be scattered in various rules. To exem-
plify this, generally renewable energies would be under the management of NEA, but for 
example geothermal energy is actually governed by the Ministry of Land and Resources. 
[25] This kind of institutional separation can become an obstacle for renewable energy 
projects, as approval needs to be gained from multiple government agencies. Sometimes 
this can also lead to conflicting regulations between agencies. 
Liu argues that the biggest obstacle for China’s energy industry reform are industry mo-
nopolies and regional market monopolies. As traditional energy-related industries are 
important taxpayers provincially, the provincial governments may protect them with pro-
vincial policies and legislation. This can make it hard for renewable energy to break 
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through. This also affects inter-provincial trade, as is evident in the eastern and southern 
China, where governments are reluctant to accept the electricity transmitted from north-
ern regions with abundant renewable energy, even though new UHV transmission lines 
have been built between the regions. [25] According to Lin and Purra, the standard best-
practice model for electricity markets would be one where electricity transmission is sep-
arated from generation and funded by transmission fees. Before the T&D tariff reform, 
China however deviated from this by having a wholesale price on electricity, that included 
both generation and transmission. It’s argued that this pricing decision has shaped sec-
toral interests and posed difficulties for marketization and regulation, as the only cost-
effective means for transmission companies to grow has been trading generated elec-
tricity. [26] Since the T&D tariff reform has taken place, government regulators set the 
transmission prices and T&D is unbundled from wholesale and retail of electricity [29]. 
According to Lin and Purra, one problem still persisting is the lack of clear distinction 
between transmission and distribution networks. In Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) countries the small-scale generators are allowed to sell 
electricity over local distribution networks and the distribution fees are set by the local 
regulators. In China, no explicit distribution charges exist, only a regulated retail tariff to 
final consumers that is controlled by the NDRC. Lin and Purra argue that the ambiguous 
distinction of authority of control over transmission and distribution networks diffuses the 
regulatory boundaries between the national, provincial and regional levels and hinders 
the creation of competitive generation market and retail competition. [26] 
4.2 The role of the central government in renewable energy in-
tegration 
Liu states that to eliminate the monopoly in the energy market, China should differentiate 
the functions of the government and the market and strengthen the basic role of the 
latter. Liu also argues that market-driven mechanisms are essential for renewable en-
ergy development and that an open and competitive modern market system needs to be 
established in order to optimize the allocation of resources. [25] Lin and Purra however 
point out that although the Chinese central government has relinquished its vertical com-
mand and control, it hasn’t yet taken on new responsibilities in regulating and supervising 
horizontal, contractual relationships. Lin and Purra argue that as China’s transitional 
electricity sector is under growing pressure to support the country’s fast expanding econ-
omy, inflexible, inefficient and even collusive institutional structures hinder the planned 
power sector reforms. [26] Also Zhang et al. call for more stronger top-level design and 
supervision from the central government in order to develop government regulation of 
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market actors and to enforce coordination over the reforms led by local governments. 
Presently local governments tend to view electricity market reform as a way to cut elec-
tricity retail tariffs and boost the local economy, while the central government’s objective 
is to optimize resource deployment and enhance renewable energy development. Ac-
cording to Zhang et al., the central government should require local governments to im-
plement the reform in alignment with the principles set by the central government. If local 
governments develop their own reform strategies, the national market will become frag-
mented. [16] Also Liu states, that the China’s State Council should formulate specific 
implementation rules for renewable energy legislation. Provincial governments should 
improve supervision and management systems and impose local laws and regulations 
that take into account both the regional status of renewable energy and the central gov-
ernment objectives. According to Liu the legal responsibilities for power grid operators 
and other energy industry enterprises should be clearly stipulated and there should be 
measures to punish those failing to meet these responsibilities. This would increase the 
practicability of the REL and reduce loopholes in its implementation. [25] This could also 
reduce the subsidy deficit caused by power generating units not paying taxes and could 
limit the practice of exploiting subsidies with so called “face” projects that are quickly 
constructed and then demolished, with no intention of producing energy. 
Liu suggests China to improve its renewable energy legal system as the REL currently 
regulating renewable energy doesn’t meet practical needs. Instead, current scattered 
laws should be formulated into a basic law for all energy related issues, the Energy Law. 
This law should be used as a base for systematically integrating or cleaning up the vari-
ous administrative rules, departmental regulations and local regulations. The legislation 
should also be constantly upgraded and policies that have been proven in practice 
should be gradually established as laws or regulations to enhance their authority and 
binding force. [25]  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY PROPOSALS 
China has made significant efforts in order to deploy considerable amounts of renewable 
energy capacity and reform its energy sector and the legislation concerning energy pro-
duction. Due to these efforts, China has become the global leader in renewable energy, 
both in investments and in capacity installed. As technological and economic develop-
ments are highly interdependent, the further integration of renewable energy requires 
investments both into the power system infrastructure and into creating mechanisms and 
platforms for open electricity markets. In the heart of the energy transition is the central 
government and its ability to enforce its policies down to the local governments. Currently 
the legislation concerning renewable energy is scattered and lacks practicability. The 
legislation needs to assign concrete responsibilities to local governments and energy 
industry enterprises, and it needs screening mechanisms to spot exploitations and rent-
seeking.  
The unbundling of transmission and distribution and electricity trading is a good step 
towards separate T&D companies, power generators and energy retailers. Similarly, it 
would be important to unbundle ancillary services from the electricity tariffs and create 
separate markets for ancillary services and demand response. This, together with open 
generation planning, would help to incentivize investments into flexible T&D networks 
and electricity markets. The ongoing pilot projects in select provinces should be scaled 
to regional and national level, in order to have real impact on the power system. As power 
system flexibility increases and market platforms develop, also spot markets should be 
established, in order to adapt to the varying output of renewable energy. This is essential 
for the optimal utilization of resources. Inter-provincial and inter-regional electricity trad-
ing is becoming physically possible thanks to investments in UHV transmission capacity, 
but some of the local governments still protect their own energy production and are re-
luctant towards importing electricity. To solve the provincial differences, central govern-
ment needs to make sure that the local legislation and regulations follow the national 
objectives of renewable energy integration.  
In order to ensure the sustainability of the renewable energy industry, the government 
needs to gradually phase out the feed-in tariffs as subsidies contribute to over-invest-
ment and low profitability of new energy companies. Measures against over-investment 
have been taken in provinces with a high curtailment rates, which is a good opportunity 
to shift focus to promoting distributed generation and the improvement of distribution 
networks in other provinces.  
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